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King Hussein of Jordan 
 
King Hussein of Jordan has been described as a prisoner of history and geography.
1
 In 
fact, he saw both as presenting him with opportunities as well as constraints. In terms of 
geography, Jordan is a classic buffer state, sandwiched between more powerful neighbours: 
to the north is Syria; to the south Egypt and Saudi Arabia; to the east Iraq and, most 
importantly, to the west Israel. But throughout his long reign (1953-99) Hussein made 
playing off enemies and rivals into an art form to ensure both the survival of Jordan as an 
independent state and the survival of the Hashemite dynasty. In terms of history, Hussein 
inherited both the incorporation into Jordan of the West Bank acquired in the war of 1948-9 
and hence of the Palestinian national question, and a sense of a broader dynastic mission from 
his grandfather, Abdullah. While his West Bank inheritance made political strife endemic to 
the Hashemite Kingdom, his sense of dynastic mission led Hussein to dream of a Hashemite 
purpose which was always larger than the boundaries imposed on Jordan. As Hussein 
described matters in private: Jordan had to have ‘a larger future than a few thousand square 
miles of sand’.2 
This sense of dynastic mission was founded on two pillars. The first was temporal: the 
raising of the Arab Revolt against the Ottoman Empire during the First World War by his 
great-grandfather, the Sharif Hussein of Mecca. The Arab Revolt provided a constant point of 
ideological reference for Hussein throughout his reign. For him it signified Arab dignity, 
unity and independence and the rejection of external, imperialist domination. Its antithesis in 
Hussein’s formulation was provided by the Anglo-French Sykes-Picot agreement of 1916 
which had conditioned the post-First World War imperialist carve up of Arab lands. While 
the Hashemites might be seen as beneficiaries of British imperialism to the extent that the 
Sharif’s sons Abdullah (Hussein’s grandfather) and Faisal had been installed respectively as 
the kings of Transjordan and Iraq, for Hussein ‘Sykes-Picot’ remained the shorthand term for 
describing an externally imposed, imperialist territorial order which had denied the Arabs full 
independence. It was a formulation to which he returned at key junctures in his reign. So, on 
6 February 1991, as an American-led air bombardment rained down on the Iraqi forces 
occupying Kuwait, Hussein warned in a highly controversial speech that ‘the real purpose 
behind this destructive war… is to destroy Iraq and rearrange the area in a manner far more 
dangerous to our nation’s present and future than the Sykes-Picot agreement.’3 Hussein kept 
up this theme in a series of speeches after the war, proclaiming the hope that ‘the turn of the 
twenty-first century heralds the resumption of the Great Arab Revolt, an interpretation of 
history in terms of freedom not oil.’4 For Hussein then, the territorial order in the Arab world 
was a transient imperialist construct. Geography in this sense did not permanently imprison 
him or his dynasty. 
The second pillar of Hussein’s dynastic mission was spiritual, provided by the 
Hashemites’ descent from the Prophet Mohammad via his daughter Fatima and her husband 
Ali. This spiritual claim to dignity and leadership was reinforced by the Hashemites’ status 
during the Ottoman era as the guardians of Mecca and Medina, the most holy Muslim sites. 
Again, this was a theme to which Hussein returned repeatedly, most controversially in the 
wake of the August 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Then, Hussein's request to be referred to 
by the title 'Sharif' soon after the crisis broke out was taken by both the Saudis and Egyptians 
to be evidence of Hashemite irredentism, the coveting of the lost lands of the Hejaz which 
had been conquered by the forces of Abdul Aziz ibn Saud in 1924, driving Hussein's great-
grandfather the Sharif Hussein into exile.
5
 Albeit that Hussein protested bitterly that he had 
never once 'in word or in deed' broken his grandfather Abdullah's commitment through the 
1925 Hadda agreement to settle the differences between the two royal houses and renounce 
the Hashemite claim on the Hejaz, still the suspicions of his intentions lingered in Jeddah 
throughout the final decade of his reign.
6
 
 If these were Hussein's claims to a broader temporal and spiritual dynastic mission, 
his brand of Hashemite Arab nationalism also led him to stake out a clear position in the Cold 
War contest in the region relatively early in his reign. 'In the great struggle between 
communism and freedom, there can be no neutrality,' he told the United Nations General 
Assembly on 3 October 1960. Hussein went on to emphasise that he 'wanted to be sure that 
there was no mistake about where Jordan stands in the conflict of ideologies that is 
endangering the peace of the world'.
7
 In his autobiography written the following year, 
Hussein developed a coherent ideological case as to why communism was incompatible with 
the Hashemite brand of Arab nationalism.
8
 This encompassed both an opposition to 
communist atheism and the aspiration for Arab independence from any form of imperialist 
influence. From Hussein's own perspective, therefore, there was an ideological justification 
for his Cold War alliance with the United States. Of course, ideology in this sense dovetailed 
neatly with practical considerations. The US alliance served Jordan's security in two respects: 
through its deterrent effect on more powerful neighbouring states which might otherwise 
have sought to overrun the kingdom; and through the provision of financial aid which 
provided budget security, helping to remedy the chronic insufficiency of Jordan's domestic 
tax base. 
Hussein’s ideology of Hashemite Arab nationalism provided the compass which 
guided his statecraft through the dramatically changing regional landscape during the final 
two decades of the Cold War era. The year 1967 proved in this respect to be the most 
significant watershed in the whole of Hussein's reign. The defeat of Jordan which had fought 
Israel as part of the coalition of Arab countries in the June war wrought a fundamental change 
in the King's mental map. The key goal of his statecraft for the remaining three decades of his 
reign was to reverse the effects of the war and to recover the Arab lands lost to Israel. In other 
words, his goal was to prevent Israel from using the outcome of the war permanently to 
redraw the map of the region. But, if Hussein was such a shrewd judge of the balance of 
power, perhaps the first and most crucial question which must be posed before considering 
the consequences of the war for Jordan is how did he come to find himself involved in the 
conflict in the first place? After all, at no stage before the war was he under any illusion about 
the extent of Israel's military superiority or the likelihood of an Arab victory. 
The key to understanding Hussein's fateful decision to sign an alliance with Egyptian 
President Gamal Abdel Nasser on 30 May 1967 and to place Jordanian forces under Egyptian 
command lies in an event which took place the previous year: the Israeli raid on the West 
Bank village of Samu. The operation, which took place early on the morning of 13 November 
1966, was a major Israeli incursion undertaken in retaliation for a previous raid by Palestinian 
Fatah guerrillas on Israeli territory which had cost the lives of three soldiers. The problem 
from Hussein's perspective was that the Fatah attacks were sponsored by the Syrian regime 
and beyond his ability to prevent. Despite this, it was Jordan which was the target of the 
Israeli retaliation which resulted in the demolition of a large part of the village of Samu and 
the deaths of fifteen Jordanian soldiers and one pilot from the Royal Jordanian Air Force. The 
situation was made even worse from Hussein's point of view by the apparent duplicity of 
Israeli actions in the period leading up to the raid. As he subsequently revealed in a dramatic 
conversation with US Ambassador Findley Burns and CIA Station Chief Jack O'Connell, he 
had met secretly over the previous three years with various Israeli leaders including Golda 
Meir and Abba Eban to explore the possibilities of resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict. During 
his exchanges with these Israeli representatives he had told them that 'I could not absorb or 
tolerate a serious retaliatory raid. They accepted the logic of this and promised that there 
would never be one.'
9
 To make matters even worse, the King had received a personal 
message from the Israelis reassuring him that they had no intention of attacking Jordan on the 
very morning that the retaliatory raid on Samu took place. Hussein drew two conclusions 
from this extraordinary sequence of events. The first was that the Israelis could not be trusted. 
The second was that they were intent on undermining Jordan and seizing the West Bank. 
It was this sense of fatalism which conditioned Hussein's response as the region slid 
towards war in late May 1967. The likelihood that Nasser's brinkmanship, involving the 
closure of the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping and the demand for the withdrawal of the 
United Nations Emergency Force from Sinai, would lead to war left Hussein with what he 
saw as a clear choice. He could sign a pact with Nasser and face Israel as part of an Arab 
coalition. Or he could try to stand alone and face the probability that Jordan would be 
dragged into the war in any case. If he stood alone, he was convinced that Israel would try to 
manufacture the circumstances to seize the West Bank.
10
 Viewed in this way Hussein's 
decision to fly to Cairo and sign a pact with Nasser becomes more comprehensible, even if it 
proved to be the most disastrous choice of his reign. 
Jordan's defeat in the June war was crushing and comprehensive. The loss of the West 
Bank deprived the country of a quarter of its cultivatable land and nearly half of its industry, 
accounting for almost 40% of its Gross National Product. In addition, the influx of 300,000 
refugees to the East Bank posed significant social and political problems.
11
 While the passing 
of United Nations Security Council resolution 242 on 22 November 1967 put on record the 
inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory through war and the need for the 'withdrawal of 
Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict', it coupled this 
requirement with the need for 'termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect 
for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence 
of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized 
boundaries free from threats or acts of force.'
12
 Hussein was willing to accept this 'land for 
peace' formula, but as the victorious power in possession of the conquered territory the Israeli 
government's strategy by contrast was one of prevarication. Opinion in Israel was divided 
between those who saw the acquisition of the West Bank as a providential opportunity to 
incorporate 'Judea' and 'Samaria' into a Greater Israel and those who believed that territorial 
compromises might be made provided Israel retained a sufficient portion of the West Bank to 
ensure its future security. But opinion across almost the entire political spectrum was united 
in the belief that Jerusalem must remain a united city under Israeli sovereignty, making a deal 
with Hussein over Arab East Jerusalem, which Israel had occupied during the war, 
impossible.
13
 
Hussein's attempts to explore the possibility of peace through his covert dialogue with 
Israeli leaders which continued after the war thus met with no success. In the meantime the 
internal situation in Jordan deteriorated, with raids by Palestinian guerrillas known as the 
fedayeen triggering severe Israeli reprisals against Jordan, a spiral of violence which served 
only to undermine Hussein's authority within his kingdom. By September 1970 the point of 
no return had been reached from Hussein's perspective and he unleashed the Jordanian army 
against the Palestinian guerrilla groups which by this time had become a state within a state. 
Much debate has surrounded the question of how far Hussein survived and triumphed in the 
September 1970 conflict as a result of Israeli support.
14
 The contemporaneous invasion of 
northern Jordan by Syrian armoured forces posing as those of the Palestine Liberation Army 
presented a direct and significant threat to the survival of his regime. However, while Israel 
did redeploy forces to its northern border along the Golan Heights, and carried out air 
reconnaissance over the invading Syrian forces, the victory on the battlefield was won by the 
Jordanian armed forces. Hussein himself remained wary of the possibility that Israel might 
take the opportunity presented by the crisis to seize additional territory in the north of his 
country. Hussein's fears were not unfounded. Israeli Defence Minister Moshe Dayan argued 
in private that 'if we go to Irbid [in northern Jordan] it will be difficult for us just to return 
it.'
15
 Opinion within the Israeli government was divided between those who saw the crisis as 
an opportunity to 'solve' the Palestinian problem by toppling the Hashemite regime and 
replacing it with a Palestinian state, and those who by contrast saw the survival of Hussein as 
being in Israel's interests since he constituted Israel's best potential peace partner in the longer 
run.
16
 In the event, the latter view prevailed. 
However, Hussein's continuing efforts to secure the return of the West Bank proved to 
be of no avail. Most significant of these attempts was his United Arab Kingdom plan 
proposed in March 1972 which would have involved the Israeli-occupied West Bank being 
joined to the East Bank in a quasi-federal structure. The two regions would each have their 
own elected parliaments which would deal with local government matters, while a national 
parliament, presided over by the King as Head of State would deal with the economy, 
defence and foreign affairs. Hussein expressed the hope that other territories such as the Gaza 
Strip might also be brought under the authority of the Palestinian entity thus created on the 
West Bank. In private he was even more expansive, arguing that this 'United Kingdom' might 
be expanded to include other Arabs, an observation which the British Ambassador in Amman 
described as 'shades of the Fertile Crescent and Hashemite rule in Damascus and Baghdad.'
17
 
Evidently even in the unpromising circumstances prevailing in the early 1970s, Hussein had 
not lost sight of his broader dynastic mission. His mental map remained a canvas on which 
Hashemite dynastic ambitions could be sketched, if not perfected. 
In the event Hussein's United Arab Kingdom plan was rejected both by the Israeli 
Government and by the leadership of the PLO. It was also overtaken by events in the shape of 
the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War. The outbreak of the war was a consequence both of the 
deadlock in the regional peace process, with the Israeli Government evidently content to sit 
tight in the territories it had conquered in 1967, and of the changing climate in superpower 
relations. Paradoxically, the effect of détente between Washington and Moscow had been to 
close off the diplomatic options available to President Sadat of Egypt in seeking to recover 
the Sinai Peninsula occupied by Israel in 1967. Neither superpower was willing to take risks 
in Middle East diplomacy which might disrupt their improved relationship so matters were 
allowed to drift with Israel consolidating the territorial status quo. Only through launching a 
war did Sadat believe he could persuade the Nixon Administration to devote its energy to the 
regional peace process, and exert the kind of diplomatic pressure on Israel which might force 
it to make territorial concessions.
18
 
Hussein for his part was excluded from the preparations for war undertaken by Sadat 
in conjunction with Syrian President Hafez Asad. However, through the activities of his head 
of military intelligence, Abboud Salem, who had recruited a senior officer in the Syrian army 
as a source early in 1973, Hussein was able to learn detailed information about the Syrian 
plan of attack. The king was to a large degree incredulous, believing that any renewed war 
with Israel risked disaster. However, he did what he could to avert its outbreak by warning 
Western interlocutors that war could come soon if no action was taken to break the 
diplomatic deadlock.
19
 He also flew covertly to Israel to meet Prime Minister Golda Meir on 
25 September 1973, in what has been termed a 'fishing expedition' to see if the Israelis had 
any information which would corroborate what he had learnt from his Syrian source. The fact 
that the Israelis did not expect war only deepened the King's incredulity at the information 
Abboud Salem had received.
20
 
The outbreak of war on 6 October 1973 posed a significant challenge for Hussein. On 
the one hand, given the experience of defeat in 1967, he was determined to avoid Jordan's 
engagement in the conflict. On the other, as the war progressed, he came under increasing 
pressure to intervene and relieve the predicament of the Syrian forces which, after initial 
advances, had been driven back by the Israelis on the Golan front. Hussein's solution to the 
problem was elegant. On 11 October he told the British Ambassador Glen Balfour Paul that 
he had decided that 'to retain any Arab credibility at all, he must make the gesture… i.e. 
despatch (in as slow a time as possible) [of] an armoured brigade to relieve the Syrian left 
wing.'
21
 The problem remained how to avoid a direct engagement with Israel as a result of the 
movement of Jordanian forces. Initially, the King communicated with the Israelis through 
British and American intermediaries, but as the Syrian front crumbled, he was left with no 
alternative but to call Prime Minister Golda Meir directly on 15 October informing her that 
'Israel should consider the Jordanian expeditionary force of the 40
th
 armoured brigade as 
hostile as of yesterday morning.'
22
 In the event, the Israelis did not directly target the 
Jordanian brigade during the remaining week of fighting and Hussein for his part, in contrast 
to 1967, maintained his refusal to place his forces under foreign command. As the war drew 
to a close, the US Ambassador in Amman, Dean Brown, wrote to Secretary of State Henry 
Kissinger in appreciation of Hussein's skilful navigation of the crisis: 'he has played the game 
beautifully', Brown observed.
23
 Hussein had managed to achieve credit in inter-Arab politics, 
particularly with the Syrians, at the same time as avoiding the destruction of his armed forces 
through maintaining channels to the Israeli government. The October war was probably the 
best example throughout the whole of Hussein's reign of his shrewd grasp of crisis 
management. 
For all Hussein's tactical skill during the crisis, what mattered to him most was 
whether the war would be followed by a reinvigorated peace process which might lead to the 
return of the Arab lands lost in 1967. Here, the results were disappointing. The focus of US 
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger on the disengagement of forces in the aftermath of the war 
left Jordan out in the cold. Paradoxically, because of Hussein's restraint there had been no 
fighting on the Jordanian front, so there was no pressing need to focus on the separation of 
forces there. Added to that was the fact that the Israeli government remained divided over 
what peace terms might be offered to Hussein, which continued to mean that no formal terms 
were actually offered. In the absence of movement, the competition between Hussein and the 
PLO leader, Yasser Arafat, over who represented the Palestinians and who had the right to 
negotiate over the West Bank, came once more to the fore. At the Rabat summit of October 
1974, the Arab states resolved that the Palestinians had the right to 'establish an independent 
national authority under the command of the PLO, the sole legitimate representative of the 
Palestinian people in any Palestinian territory that is liberated.'
24
 Whatever Hussein's own 
dynastic inheritance, from now on the resolution obliged him to defer to the PLO in any 
future negotiations over the West Bank. 
Nevertheless, there remained other potential outlets for Hussein’s sense of dynastic 
mission during this period. The close relations with the Syrian regime of Hafez Asad which 
he cultivated with the help of his Prime Minister Zeid Rifai during the mid-1970s were not 
without their dynastic dimension. Hussein's grandfather Abdullah had cherished the notion of 
a Hashemite-led 'Greater Syria' which might incorporate Syria, Palestine and Transjordan and 
while this remained a largely unspoken assumption of Hussein's Syrian policy, he did on one 
occasion allow his guard to slip, telling US Ambassador Dean Brown, as noted above, that 
Jordan had to have 'a larger future than a few thousand square miles of sand'.
25
  
One clear element of community of interest between the Syrian leader Hafez Asad 
and King Hussein lay in their mutual suspicion of the Egyptian President Anwar Sadat. The 
Syrian view was that Sadat had formed an alliance and fought the October War under false 
pretences, intending only to pursue his own territorial goals. With the post-war peace process 
seemingly stalled on the Egyptian front after two limited Sinai disengagement agreements, 
Sadat now took a dramatic initiative in the form of his decision to fly to Jerusalem and 
address the Israeli Knesset in person on 19 November 1977. His initiative cut across the 
negotiations which had been brokered by the Administration of the new US President Jimmy 
Carter towards the resumption of the multilateral Geneva Conference, which had convened 
briefly after the October war in December 1973, then adjourned indefinitely. A return to 
Geneva was close, as evidenced by a private letter from Carter to Hussein on 30 October in 
which he wrote that ‘I strongly believe that the time has come for us to move boldly to 
reconvene the Conference’.26 Sadat was also aware that the resumption of the conference was 
a serious possibility, but did not want to run the risk that Egyptian interests might be 
subsumed in a joint Arab negotiating position. Hence his dramatic personal initiative. 
From the outset, Hussein had serious doubts about Sadat’s approach. It was not just 
the timing or the fact that the Sadat visit to Jerusalem had stopped the multilateral negotiating 
process in its tracks. The visit of an Arab leader to occupied Jerusalem had great symbolic 
significance, particularly for Hussein as a Hashemite. As he later told US National Security 
Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski: ‘the visit to Jerusalem under occupation had great religious 
significance. My grandfather is buried there. He was involved in the Arab revolt against 
colonial rule and he died because he would not compromise. We lost Jerusalem in 1967 under 
Egyptian command…. The Sadat visit was a very, very big shock.’27 The King’s words 
perfectly plotted the visit’s significance within the parameters of his own mental map. First 
there was the spiritual dimension in terms of Jerusalem’s religious importance. Then there 
was the temporal dimension in terms of the reference to the Arab revolt. Finally, there was 
the spatial dimension in terms of the loss of Jerusalem in 1967 under Egyptian command. In 
every respect the Sadat visit transgressed a crucial boundary from Hussein’s perspective. It is 
doubtful, however, whether the King’s American interlocutor, Brzezinski, understood the full 
significance of his words. He more likely saw them more as a piece of special pleading 
mustered for the purpose of explaining Hussein’s refusal to accept the consequences of the 
Sadat visit in terms of the subsequent bilateral Egyptian-Israeli negotiating process.  
The main consequence of the Sadat visit, after a protracted period of negotiation, was 
the convening of a summit, under the auspices of President Carter, at the presidential retreat 
of Camp David in September 1978, which brought together Sadat and the Israeli Prime 
Minister Menachem Begin. The goals of the summit from the perspective of its American 
hosts were to provide a framework for a bilateral Egyptian-Israeli peace agreement but also a 
framework for broader peace in the Middle East. The latter goal required a solution to the 
problem of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Given that Begin was willing to offer no more 
than a form of limited local autonomy to the Palestinians in the occupied territories, Hussein 
held a potentially pivotal position. It would only be with his cooperation that any transitional 
autonomy plan might be fully implemented. But even before the Camp David summit 
convened, Hussein had written to Carter on 27 August 1978 expressing his fear that Israel’s 
intransigence on the Palestinian question ‘might prompt the participants to issue a vague and 
uncommiting document of principles aimed at de-emphasizing the differences and inviting 
other participants.’28 Hussein expressed the same fear in his final letter to Sadat before the 
summit convened.
29
 
In the event this proved to be an accurate prediction of what transpired at Camp 
David.
30
 Sadat showed little interest in the broader framework agreement and focused his 
efforts on the bilateral Egyptian-Israeli issues. It was left to the American hosts to try to 
persuade Begin to accept a more expansive autonomy agreement. In the event, their efforts 
met with little success in this regard. The ‘Framework for Peace in the Middle East’, which 
was the second of the two main documents agreed by Begin and Sadat, left Hussein in an 
anomalous position.
31
 It called on Jordan to join in negotiations regarding transitional 
arrangements for the West Bank and Gaza and also stipulated that Jordan would participate in 
joint patrols with Israel in maintaining security. It also laid out a timetable which required 
Jordan to start negotiations with Israel over a peace treaty by the third year of a planned five 
year transitional period. But Hussein had not been consulted about any of these requirements 
which, at the very least, made the agreement high-handed in respect of the assumptions it 
made about the Jordanian role. As King Hussein described the position: ‘then came the 
agreement, a very limited agreement…. The role provided for Jordan under the Camp David 
agreements was that of a policeman, to ensure the security of who, - the occupied? We tried 
to keep as quiet as possible. But that is not a role we could play. What we wanted to know 
was what was the final object?’32 Hussein now came under strong pressure from President 
Carter to back the Camp David agreement despite its weaknesses. In a private, handwritten 
letter Carter urged ‘I need your strong personal support’.33 
In a bid to pin down more precisely the meaning of the framework document, and also 
to play for time, the King submitted a list of fourteen questions about the agreement to US 
Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, who agreed to provide him with written answers.
34
 However, 
the American answers did little to assuage Hussein’s fundamental doubts about the Camp 
David framework. As he made clear in a cold letter sent to Sadat on 14 October, he viewed 
the framework agreement on peace in the Middle East as vague and any transitional 
agreement without a stated end goal as ‘useless’ since Israel would continue to change facts 
on the ground in the occupied territories through its settlement activities.
35
 In a letter sent to 
President Carter on 31 October Hussein made it clear that he did not believe the Camp David 
framework was just or workable. Whereas the bilateral Egyptian-Israeli agreement 
acknowledged Egyptian sovereignty over the Sinai, the framework document left open to 
negotiation the future of the West Bank and Gaza. ‘I believe there was no balance in this’, 
Hussein wrote, ‘particularly as the document dealing with the West Bank and Gaza was very 
explicit in its provisions regarding the transitional agreements and the Jordanian role and 
responsibilities in them.’ In a damning conclusion Hussein argued that the agreements 
offered ‘no definite answers to our fundamental concerns, namely the ultimate total Israeli 
withdrawal, self-determination for the Palestinians and the return of Arab Jerusalem to Arab 
sovereignty.’36 
Hussein’s stance resulted in a rupture in his relations with the United States which 
might have had very serious consequences for Jordan’s defence and budget security were it 
not for a new tack taken by the King in his regional policy. The summit conference of Arab 
heads of state held in Baghdad in November 1978, which agreed to take steps to isolate Egypt 
in the Arab world, also witnessed the cementing of a new, closer relationship between Jordan 
and Iraq. This was founded on the close personal relationship between the King and the Iraqi 
vice-president, soon to become president, Saddam Hussein. Throughout the remainder of the 
Cold War era, between 1979 and 1991, this Iraqi-Jordanian axis remained at the heart of 
Hussein’s policy. While its initial raison d’être was the King’s search for budget security, 
with Saddam playing the pivotal role in negotiating and funding a pledge to Jordan of $1.25 
billion per annum in aid over the coming decade, the alliance was soon further cemented by 
the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and the outbreak of war between Iraq and Iran in 1980. These 
twin events had a very significant effect on each of the temporal, spiritual and spatial 
dimensions of Hussein’s mental map. In terms of the temporal dimension, the King came to 
see Saddam as a champion of ‘Arabism’, defending Arab independence and dignity. A 
common theme of his speeches in the 1980s was that Iraq had picked up the banner of the 
Arab Revolt and was advancing in the vanguard of the Arab nation. According to Hussein, 
‘we Jordanian have always been heirs to the principles of the great Arab revolution…. Our 
support for Iraq is an inevitable extension of our principled stands because Iraq is right and 
demands nothing but justice.’37 In terms of the spiritual dimension, Hussein was highly 
critical of the Iranian Revolution, arguing that it represented a perversion of Islam. The 
Khomeini regime was ‘an anachronism and an insult to human rights, dignity and the true 
teachings of Islam.’38 Worse than that it threatened a Sunni-Shia split, which held 
‘incalculable dangers of instability, strife, bloodshed and disintegration.’39 Finally, in terms 
of the spatial dimension, Hussein argued that revolutionary Iran threatened the eastern border 
of the Arab world. Albeit that it was Saddam Hussein who had taken the initiative in 
launching the Iran-Iraq war through his invasion of Iran in September 1980, still the King 
argued that it was Iran which entertained designs on Arab lands. As he saw matters, it was 
‘the whole idea and attitude of Iran in this area that we are up against, that it can fragment the 
area, that it can dominate the area, that it can act as a strongman in the area, that it can 
threaten whenever it feels like others in the area….’40 
Hussein also found a justification for his stance in terms of the Cold War context. 
According to his formulation, the Soviets had backed the Iranian Revolution from the 
beginning and were its ‘most logical inheritors’.41 This was because Moscow would benefit 
most from the instability in the Arab world which the Iranians were aiming to engender. 
Hussein supported his argument with evidence drawn from his own visit to Moscow in June 
1982, during which he claimed that Soviet leaders had suggested they might remove their 
remaining armed forces from the border with Iran, thus freeing additional Iranian divisions to 
menace Iraq and the Gulf states.
42
 Given that Hussein deployed this claim as part of a battery 
of arguments aimed at persuading the United States to abandon its neutrality and tilt towards 
support of Iraq at a critical juncture in the war during the spring and early summer of 1982, 
an element of special pleading was no doubt present in his approach. However, there was a 
kernel of truth in his argument that the Iran-Iraq war presented certain opportunities to the 
Soviet Union to enhance its position in the Gulf region. The Kuwaiti request for the 
reflagging of its tankers, which were threatened by Iranian attacks, delivered jointly to 
Moscow and Washington in late 1986 was one illustration of such opportunities. 
One further aspect of Hussein’s support for Iraq deserves consideration here: how far 
it dovetailed with his dynastic ambitions? While for the most part these continued to lie 
dormant during the 1980s, Hussein was always conscious of the Hashemite legacy in Iraq. 
Immediately after the revolution of July 1958, which had swept away the Hashemite 
monarchy in Baghdad, he had considered asserting his own right to the Iraqi throne as he was 
entitled to do under the terms of the recently concluded Iraqi-Jordanian Union.
43
 While the 
swift consolidation of power by the Iraqi Free Officers who had toppled the monarchy, 
together with the diffidence of the Western powers, had thwarted his ambitions at that stage, 
his despatch of Wasfi al-Tall as Jordanian Ambassador to Iraq between 1960 and 1962 
illustrated his continuing interest in building Jordanian influence in Iraq with a view to 
capitalising on any potential collapse of the regime of Brigadier Abd al-Karim Qasim.
44
 
Clearly, the King could not afford any hint of continuing dynastic interest in Iraq to cloud his 
relationship with Saddam Hussein during the 1980s. However, the Iraqi leader’s honouring of 
the Hashemite heritage in Iraq through the renovation of the royal cemetery and the reading 
of prayers for the souls of King Feisal I and King Ghazi during one of King Hussein’s visits 
to Baghdad showed that Saddam was aware of his sensibilities.
45
 Nevertheless, it was not 
until after the mid-1990s, with the isolation of Iraq in the wake of its expulsion from Kuwait, 
coupled with a significant distancing in his own relationship with Saddam Hussein, that King 
Hussein’s dynastic ambitions in Iraq re-emerged more openly through his support for efforts 
to overthrow Saddam.
46
 
From the summer of 1982 onwards, the Iran-Iraq war remained deadlocked, with 
neither side able to advance significantly on the ground. Six years of effective stalemate 
ensued. In that respect, the conflict had something in common with the stalled Arab-Israeli 
peace process which was Hussein’s other main concern during the 1980s. Ironically, the first 
key initiative taken during this period to break the deadlock in the peace process was also 
military in character. The Likud government of Menachem Begin sought, through a full scale 
invasion of Lebanon in June 1982, to redraw the map of the region again, eradicating the 
PLO as a political and military force and cowing the Arab states into submission. The Israeli 
invasion re-awakened a perennial Hashemite nightmare: that Israel might seek to ‘solve’ the 
Palestinian problem by driving the Palestinians out of the occupied territories into Jordan, 
toppling the Hashemite regime in the process and creating a Palestinian state on the East 
Bank. This nightmare went by the shorthand euphemism of ‘transfer’, and was referred to 
under the slogan ‘Jordan is Palestine’ in the political argot of Likud politicians such as Ariel 
Sharon, the Israeli Minister of Defence who had orchestrated the invasion of Lebanon. As 
Hussein described the situation in a letter to President Reagan: ‘Sharon’s desire… is to drive 
them [the Palestinians] eventually into Jordan that they may be joined by others driven out of 
the West Bank and Gaza so that in time and with more Jewish settlers in the occupied 
Palestinian territories when the issue of self-determination is addressed the results would be 
guaranteed in Israel’s favour.’47 The result for Jordan according to Hussein would be the 
establishment of ‘a docile Palestinian state’ under Israeli tutelage on Jordanian soil. 
In a bid to assuage its Arab allies, and atone in part for its supine reaction to the 
Israeli invasion, the US tried to break the deadlock in the peace process by launching the 
eponymous ‘Reagan Plan’ on 1 September 1982. This re-introduced the concept of a 
Jordanian role in the West Bank through formal Israeli withdrawal and the creation of a 
system of local self-government in association with Jordan. Hussein did what he could to 
coordinate a joint response to the Reagan Plan with the PLO, whose central role in any 
negotiations over the West Bank had been reaffirmed by the Arab summit at Fez between 8 
and 10 September 1982. However, the pressures on Arafat both from within the PLO and 
from various Arab states, particularly Syria, alongside the Israeli rejection of the plan and the 
US refusal to deal with the PLO, made a compromise agreement between Hussein and the 
PLO leader unattainable at this juncture. Nevertheless, Hussein continued his efforts at 
coordination over the next two years, eventually arriving at a deal with Arafat in February 
1985, known as the ‘Amman Accord’. This appeared to offer a way forward by bringing the 
PLO into negotiations within the framework of an international conference, and proposing 
Palestinian self-determination in a confederation with Jordan. Hussein made it clear in private 
communications with Washington that he interpreted the agreement as meaning PLO 
attendance at the conference could only take place within a joint delegation with Jordan and 
that Palestinian self-determination would have to be within a state ‘confederally united with 
the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan’.48 
The agreement immediately met with criticism from all sides. Israel refused to 
negotiate with the PLO, while Syria once again took the lead in organising Arab opposition, 
mustering Palestinian critics of the deal with a view to toppling Arafat. Under pressure, the 
PLO leader started back-pedalling, attaching conditions to his acceptance of UNSC resolution 
242. Hussein persevered in trying to sell the agreement, conducting covert discussions with 
the Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres twice in London during 1985, and lobbying hard in 
Washington for the Reagan Administration’s support. But it was not to be. By the beginning 
of 1986 Hussein’s patience with Arafat had run out and on 19 February 1986 he announced 
the failure of the Amman Accord with a stinging rebuke to Arafat: ‘we are unable to continue 
to coordinate politically with the PLO leadership until such time as their word becomes their 
bond….’49 
It was at this juncture that Hussein’s own dynastic ambitions re-emerged more clearly 
through the attempt to build up the Hashemite role in the occupied territories between 1986 
and 1988 in covert cooperation with Israel. All PLO offices in Jordan were closed during 
1986 and a projected five-year Jordanian development plan for the West Bank and Gaza was 
announced. Meanwhile further covert discussions took place in London in April 1987 
between the King and Shimon Peres, who by this time had taken up the role of Israeli Foreign 
Minister. But the so called ‘London Agreement’ which the two men struck was undermined 
by internal politics in Israel, in the form of the opposition of Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, 
and by diffidence in Washington, with US Secretary of State George Shultz refusing to take 
on the role of advocating the agreement in the face of Shamir’s opposition.50 The outbreak of 
the Palestinian Intifada at the end of 1987 drove the final nail into the coffin of Jordanian 
attempts to play a role independent of the PLO in the occupied territories. By July 1988 King 
Hussein decided to cut his losses, announcing Jordan’s unilateral administrative 
disengagement from the West Bank and putting the ball firmly in the PLO’s court to develop 
a viable negotiating position. 
As the Cold War in Europe drew to a close at the end of 1989, tensions in the Middle 
East were if anything rising. The era of glasnost in the Soviet Union had direct, pernicious 
effects in the region from the point of view of King Hussein in the form of the influx of a 
wave of Soviet Jewish immigrants to Israel. Hussein’s concern was that these immigrants 
would predominantly be accommodated in settlements in the occupied territories raising 
tensions still further and making the negotiation of Israeli withdrawal even more difficult. 
The decline of the Soviet Union as a balancing power to the United States, coupled with the 
consequences of the end of the Iran-Iraq war for Saddam Hussein’s policy made the period 
1989-90 one of great uncertainty in the region. There was much talk at this juncture of a so 
called ‘New World Order’ but in Hussein’s formulation this was a largely negative concept. 
It stood for unchallenged American hegemony and the trampling of Arab independence and 
rights. Indeed, this was a repeated refrain of his public interventions during the crisis which 
followed in the wake of the 2 August 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. 
During the first phase of the crisis King Hussein attempted to play the role of 
mediator between Iraq and the United States. But his position was widely perceived in the 
West and in most Arab quarters as being sympathetic to that of Iraq. With the failure of his 
mediation efforts and the launching of the American-led air and subsequent ground campaign 
to evict Iraqi forces from Kuwait, Hussein’s frustration boiled over. In a remarkable speech 
on 6 February 1991, already quoted above, Hussein spoke with particular bitterness about the 
supposed ‘New World Order’ which would follow the end of the Cold War: ‘the talk about a 
New World Order whose early feature is the destruction of Iraq, and the persistence of this 
talk as the war continues, lead us to wonder about the identity of this order and instil in us 
doubts regarding its nature.’ He proceeded to lambast the role of the United Nations and the 
international coalition assembled against Iraq, particularly its Arab members, concluding that 
‘I say that any Arab or Muslim can realise the magnitude of this crime committed against his 
religion and his nation.’51 Hussein’s speech drew a swift response from US President George 
Bush who wrote to him on 9 February asserting that ‘your words exculpate Saddam Hussein 
for the most serious and most brazen crime against the Arab nation by another Arab in 
modern times….’52 But Hussein was steadfast in defence of his position: ‘while I do not… 
question your right to express yourself in defence of your policies and objectives, I am not 
able to concede mine as a Hashemite Arab Muslim….’53 
One further footnote is worth adding here regarding the changed contours of the 
international order as the Cold War ended. The Gulf crisis witnessed Soviet President 
Mikhail Gorbachev staking out a position which was almost wholly supportive of the US 
approach. Indeed, as Iraq began to target Israel with Scud missiles after the launching of the 
coalition air campaign, Gorbachev wrote to King Hussein emphasising how little sympathy 
he had for Iraq and urging the King to take a ‘responsible and balanced position’ in response 
to Saddam’s attacks.54 The attempt to distract Arab attention from the occupation of Kuwait 
through the instigation of conflict with Israel must not be allowed to succeed, Gorbachev 
warned. There could be no clearer indication of the changed circumstances prevailing in the 
region at the end of the Cold War than a Soviet leader warning an Arab client of the United 
States not to rise to the bait offered by an Arab client of the Soviet Union in attacking Israel. 
The conclusion of the Gulf crisis left King Hussein more isolated than at any point in 
his long reign. The pursuit of the revived regional peace process, which involved the 
convening at American instigation of a multilateral conference in Madrid on 30 October 
1991, offered him his only potential outlet. But Hussein’s pursuit of the peace process, which 
culminated in the signing of the Jordanian-Israeli Peace Treaty on 26 October 1994, was 
much more a question of long-standing conviction on his part, facilitated by the changed 
circumstances prevailing in the region after the end of the Cold War, than mere necessity. 
Looking back over the course he had charted through the final two decades of the Cold War 
era, it is clear that he had been guided throughout by the three key parameters of his mental 
map: spiritual in the form of the particular destiny of the Hashemites as descendants of the 
Prophet and custodians of the holy shrines of Islam to provide leadership; temporal in the 
form of the legacy of the Arab Revolt and its symbolism for Arab dignity and independence; 
and spatial in terms of the drive to retrieve the Arab lands lost in 1967. While his statecraft 
was characterised for the most part more by striving than achieving, that was perhaps 
ultimately more a measure of his ambitions than his accomplishments. 
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